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Lammon: Perlman Appeals After Mohawk

PERLMAN APPEALS AFTER MOHAWK
Bryan Lammon
Abstract
When a federal district court orders the disclosure of allegedly
privileged information,privilege claimants have had-until recently-at
least one option for seeking immediate appellate review. Claimants who
control disclosure can disobey the order, be found in contempt, and
immediately appeal the contempt finding. Claimants who don't control
disclosure can take what's called a Perlman appeal. But that latter
option is disappearingfor some litigants. Several courts of appeals
recently have held that only non-parties can take Perlman appeals. For
parties, an appeal after final judgment must suffice.
This development in the Perlman doctrine is mistaken. Contempt
appeals and Perlman appeals both exist to protect against a specific
harm of erroneous discovery orders-the disclosure of confidential
information. Once confidential information is disclosed, its secrecy is
lost and can never be recovered. Contempt appeals and Perlman appeals
provide privilege claimants a chance -at appellate review before the
secrecy of privileged information is forever lost. And given this purpose,
party or non-party status is irrelevant; an appeal after a final judgment
is useless for both.
Analysis of this development in the Perlmandoctrine reveals a larger
point about interlocutory appeals. We are closer now than we have been
in some time to codifying the judge-made exceptions to the finaljudgment rule. But literatureexamining this area of law is incomplete.
Too many discrete issues have been overlooked. And if codification is to
succeed, much work needs to be done. I end this article by laying the
groundwork for that future research--a taxonomy of exceptions to the
final-judgment rule. Not only will this taxonomy provide some necessary
structure for the study of appellate jurisdiction, but it will also help
identify the many areas of appellatejurisdiction worth exploring and the
connections between these areas.

* Assistant Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. My thanks to Eric Chaffee, Edward
Cooper, Greg Gilchrist, Pauline Kim, Susan Martin, Andrew Pollis, Nicole Porter, Bill Richman,
Michael Solimine, Lee Strang, and participants in the University of Toledo College of Law faculty
roundtable. And special thanks to the University of Toledo College of Law for providing summer
funding for this project.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal litigants generally must wait until the end of district court
proceedings before taking an appeal. But not always. Numerous
exceptions to this general rule (known as the "final-judgment rule")
exist.' And these exceptions-which are spread across statutes, rules of
procedure, and judicial decisions-are maligned for creating
an
2
immense, complex, and confusing web of appellate jurisdiction.
Some of the most consistently vexing appellate jurisdiction issues
involve appeals from discovery orders, particularly those adverse to a
claim of privilege. 3 Litigants have long tested the appealability of these
orders. But courts have, for the most part, rebuffed those efforts,
creating only a few narrow avenues for seeking immediate relief from
discovery orders. The primary means of appealing a discovery order is
the contempt option-the target of a discovery order can refuse to
comply, be found in contempt, immediately appeal the contempt
finding, and use that appeal to obtain review of the underlying discovery
order. And when a discovery order doesn't target a privilege claimantwhen, for example, an attorney is ordered to testify over a claim of
attorney-client privilege-the claimant could immediately appeal under
what's known as the Perlman doctrine.4
But things are changing. The courts of appeals have recently cut back
on the scope of Perlman appeals, suggesting that only non-parties can
take them. And these courts have done so spurred primarily by the
Supreme Court's statement in its most recent major case on
interlocutory appeals-Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter-which
1. Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 423, 428-29 (2013). For an overview of the judge-made exceptions to the final judgment rule,

see, e.g., Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem,
Wrong Solution, 54 U. PiTT. L. REv. 717, 737-47 (1993); Aaron R. Petty, The Hidden Harmony of
Appellate Jurisdiction, 62 S.C. L. REv. 353, 360-86 (2010). For an overview of the statutory and rulebased exceptions to the final-judgment rule, see, e.g., Martineau, supra, at 729-36.
2. See, e.g., Martineau, supra note I, at 729 ("[The unanimous view of commentators is that
the [final-judgment] rule has either too many or too few exceptions, but in any event requires
revision."); Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REv. 1237, 1238-39
(2007) (cataloguing criticisms of the current interlocutory appeal system).
3. See generally David S. Coale, Five Years After Mohawk: Interlocutory Review of Key
Pretrial Rulings, 34 REv. LITIG. 1 (2015); Robyn R. English, Limitations on the U.S. District Courts'
Discretion: Immediate Review of Post-Aropostiale Discovery Decisions, 44 GEO. J. INT. L. 1455
(2013); Nicole E. Paolini, The Cohen Collateral Order Doctrine: The Proper Vehicle for Interlocutory
Appeal of Discovery Orders, 64 TuL. L. REV. 215 (1989); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate
Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims,
81 WASH. L. REv. 733 (2006).
4. See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918); see also Church of Scientology of Cal. v.
United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.l 1 (1992) ("[A] discovery order directed at a disinterested third party is
treated as an immediately appealable final order because the third party presumably lacks a sufficient
stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance." (citing Perlman, 247 U.S. 7)).
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held that an appeal after a final judgment generally suffices to protect
the rights of parties facing an order to disclose allegedly privileged
information.
This new restriction on Perlman is mistaken. Discovery orders
adverse to a claim of privilege can implicate a unique harm: wrongful
disclosure. Privileged information is secret, and once lost that secrecy
can never be recovered. Perlman appeals-like contempt appealsexist to allow appellate review before privileged information is
disclosed and secrecy is forever lost. Given this purpose, the party or
non-party status of a privilege claimant is largely immaterial; an appeal
after a final judgment is worthless to both.
So why have the courts of appeals so unanimously gotten this wrong?
I suspect the courts deciding these issues overlook Perlman's purpose.
And they likely did so due to the incomplete body of knowledge on
Perlman appeals.
These appeals have not (until now) received
substantial academic study. Indeed, many discrete issues involving
appeals before a final judgment have not been sufficiently addressed in
the literature. And research exploring these issues could be more
valuable now than ever before. After decades of calls for reform, the
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules recently has explored the
possibility of codifying the judge-made exceptions to the final-judgment
rule. 5 This would be a daunting task. It could also be a worthwhile one.
If codification is to succeed, much research needs to be done.
But before getting to that, more on Perlman. Part II starts with a brief
background on appeals before a final judgment, followed by an
exploration of Perlman appeals both before and after Mohawk. Part III
then contends that post-Mohawk developments in the Perlman doctrine
are mistaken, largely due to the courts overlooking Perlman's purpose.
Finally, in Part IV, I set out a preliminary taxonomy to guide study of
the exceptions to the final-judgment rule. This taxonomy-though
preliminary-will both illuminate areas for further research and allow
researchers to see similarities, differences, purposes, practices, strengths,
weaknesses, and more. I also outline several topics for research within
this taxonomy that are ripe for pursuit. Part V concludes.

5. See Advisory Committee on Appellate Procedure, Minutes of Spring 2014 Meeting, Item
Nos. 09-AP-D & 1-AP-F (response to Mohawk Industries) (Apr. 28 and 29, 2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/appellate-minutes-04-2014.pdf.; see
also Catherine T. Struve, Memorandum re Item Nos. 09-AP-D & 1J-AP-F, in Agenda Book for the
Advisory
Committee
on
Appellate
Rules,
at
169
(Oct.
20,
2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%2B0ooks/Appellate/2014-10Appeals-Agenda-Book.pdf.
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II. THE FINAL-JUDGMENT RULE AND DISCOVERY APPEALS
A. Appeals Before a FinalJudgment

District court judges often decide a number of issues during the
course of litigation. Nearly all of these decisions are interlocutorythey're made at some point before a final judgment and leave other
issues for later resolution. As a general rule, federal litigants must wait
until the end of proceedings in the district court-when all issues have
been decided and all that remains is enforcing the judgment-before
appealing an interlocutory order. 7 This limit on federal appellate
jurisdiction is codified8 at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and commonly called the
"final-judgment rule."
The final-judgment rule is thought to strike the general balance
between the conflicting interests in appellate review-efficiency and
error correction. 9 The efficiency benefits are obvious: district court
proceedings are free from appellate interruption, appellate judges
generally address a case only once, litigants are saved the cost and
potential harassment of multiple appeals, and interlocutory appeals that
might eventually become unnecessary-say, because the aggrieved
party ultimately prevails at trial-are avoided. 10 But the final-judgment
rule also has costs. Appellate decisions can develop unclear areas of the
law and correct errors. Appellate intervention can speed along trial
court proceedings and cut short what would later be deemed
unnecessary litigation. And the delay between an erroneous district
court decision and vindication on appeal can cause substantial,
sometimes irreparable, harms. 1
6. I've adapted much of this section's introductory material from Lammon, supra note 1,at
428-31.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ("The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of
the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court
of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court."); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (defining a "final decision" as one
that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment").
But see Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund, 134 S.Ct. 773, 780 (2014) (holding that
outstanding issues regarding fees and costs will not preclude a judgment from being final); Budinich v.
Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988) (same).
8. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994); Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 543 (1985) (Brennan, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977). For discussion of the final-judgment rule's history, see, e.g.,
Petty, supranote I, at 356-60.
9. See, e.g., RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 805 (8th ed. 2011).
10. See, e.g., Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in
Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987).
I1. Cf Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955) (noting that exceptions to
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By generally postponing appeal until the end of district court
proceedings, the final-judgment rule reflects a belief that the benefits of
delaying appeal outweigh the costs in most cases. 12 But like any rule,
the final-judgment rule strikes that balance only generally. Sometimes
the balance shifts because the need of immediate review outweighs (or
is at least thought to outweigh) the loss in efficiency. 13 And sometimes
it can be more efficient-systematically speaking-to allow
interlocutory appeals.' 4
So the final-judgment rule has exceptions. In fact, it has many
15 Some are found in statutes.' 6 Others are in rules. 17 And
exceptions.
still others come
from judicial decisions. 18
the final-judgment address the "need to permit litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of
serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence."). For example, parties who cannot obtain immediate review
might feel compelled to abandon or settle a case-even if they would have won on appeal-rather than
bear the costs of discovery and trial.
12. See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3911.2, at 379 (2d ed. 1992) ("The final-judgment rule ... rests on a rough
calculation that ordinarily the balance between the values of immediate appeal and delayed appeal
swings in favor of deferring appeal.")
13. Immunity appeals are a primary example of this situation.
14. Arguments for a system of discretionary appeals (discussed momentarily) often make this
point. See, e.g., Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, DiscretionaryAppellate Review of NonFinal Orders: It's Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285, 301-02 (1999). 1 have
argued elsewhere that this is an entirely plausible argument. See Lammon, supra note 1, at 434. But it
is one for which the opposite argument-that discretionary appeals would be overall less efficient-is
similarly plausible. See id. The point is that we do not know-and likely cannot know-which
argument is more accurate without trying out a system of discretionary appeals. (I suggest one potential
way for conducting such an experiment in Part IV.) The same goes for many arguments about the likely
effects of any change to the system of interlocutory appeals. See id. at 432-36.
15. For a more in-depth discussion of the exceptions to the final-judgment rule, see Timothy P.
Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: DiscretionaryReview of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 175, 182-201 (2001); Martineau, supra note 1, at 729-47; Andrew S.Pollis, The Need for NonDiscretionaryInterlocutory Appellate Review in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 1643,
1652-59 (2011) [hereinafter Pollis, MultidistrictLitigation];Steinman, supra note 2, at 1244-72.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), for example, gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals
from "[i]nterlocutory orders ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions." The Federal Arbitration Act permits immediate appeals
from interlocutory orders involving arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)-(2). And a district court can
certify an interlocutory order for immediate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) so long as the order
involves "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and.., an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the litigation."
17. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) allows for immediate appeals from district court orders
granting or denying class certification. And Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) authorizes a district
court to enter a final judgment for some (but not all) of the claims or parties in a case "if the court
determines that there is no just reason for delay," thereby allowing an immediate appeal from orders that
would otherwise have to wait for a final judgment.
18. The major judge-made exception to the final-judgment rule is the collateral order doctrine.
See Lammon, supra note 1, at 431 (calling the collateral order doctrine "the most common and most
maligned exception to the final-judgment rule). Although the exact requirements of that doctrine can
vary from case to case, it generally allows immediate appeals from types of orders that are conclusively
decided in the district court, separate from the merits of the trial court proceedings, and effectively

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

5

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

B. Immediate Appeal ofDiscovery Orders

Some of the most persistently difficult issues in interlocutory appeals
involve the appealability of discovery orders. Federal litigants have
long tested the appealability of discovery orders.' 9 But the courts have
And for good reason. Discovery
regularly rebuffed these efforts.
decisions are often within the district court judge's discretion; they're
accordingly less likely to be reversed and thus less in need of immediate
review.
Discovery rulings are sometimes subject to change as
litigation
proceeds,
which might obviate the need to appeal a discovery
22
order. And discovery orders are part of a district court judge's control
over pretrial litigation. Immediate appellate review of discovery 23
orders
could thus interfere with the judge's management of the litigation.
That being said, there are ways to immediately appeal some discovery
orders. The standard method is a contempt appeal. 4 With this option,
the targets of discovery orders can disobey a discovery order and risk
being found in contempt of court. If found in contempt, they can (with
25
one exception noted below) immediately appeal the contempt ruling.
In that appeal, the privilege claimants can challenge the underlying

discovery order. 26 So, for example, if a party in civil litigation is
ordered to disclose conversations he had with his attorney over a claim
of attorney-client privilege, the party can refuse to comply, be held in
contempt, and immediately appeal the ruling that the conversation is not

unreviewable after a final judgment. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009);
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). Another judge-made exception is "pragmatic
finality," which allows courts to balance the costs and benefits of an immediate appeal on a case-by-case
basis (though nowadays courts very rarely invoke this exception). See Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); see generally 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3913; Martin H.
Redish, The PragmaticApproach to Appealability in the FederalCourts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89 (1975).
19. See 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3914.23, at 123 ("[L]itigants continue to test the
opportunities for [appealing discovery orders] in great numbers.")
20. See Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 109; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368,
377 (1981); 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3914.23, at 123 ("Despite the continued assaults of
many litigants, the rule remains settled that most discovery rulings are not final.").
21. See 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3914.23, at 123.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. ("The basic means of securing review is disobedience to an order compelling
discovery, followed by an adjudication of contempt and appeal from the contempt order."); see also id.
at 140 ("The most generally available means of securing review of a discovery order is to disobey the
order, be held in contempt, and appeal the contempt adjudication."); Robertson, supra note 3, at 742
("The oldest method of seeking immediate review of privilege determinations required that a party risk
litigation sanctions.").
25. See Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906).
26. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 327-28 (1940).
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privileged.

27

Or someone ordered to testify before a grand jury over a

claim of fifth amendment privilege can refuse, be held in contempt, and
immediately appeal the ruling that the privilege against selfincrimination did not apply. 28
The contempt option is hardly perfect.

For one thing, being found

in contempt doesn't guarantee appealability. Contempt comes in two
forms: civil and criminal. The type of contempt can affect appealability;
non-parties can appeal from findings of both civil and criminal
contempt, while parties can appeal only from findings of criminal
contempt. 30 A privilege claimant often will not know ahead of time
what type of contempt a court might order. 3 1 So a party seeking to take

a contempt appeal risks the possibility that the court will find the party
in civil contempt and render an immediate appeal unavailable. The
contempt option also can exact an immense toll on those seeking appeal;

contempt penalties can involve large fines and jail time. 32 When the
privilege claimant is the target of a discovery order, however, the

contempt option is probably the most reliable (though not especially
attractive) means for the claimant to obtain immediate review.
But discovery orders aren't always directed to the privilege claimant.
This occurs, for example, when a court orders someone's attorney to
testify before a grand jury. The client holds the attorney-client
privilege, but the discovery order targets the attorney. In these
circumstances, the contempt option is often off the table-the third-

party custodian of the information can rarely be expected to risk
contempt just so the privilege claimant can take an immediate appeal.
So in our attorney-client example, the privilege-holding client cannot

refuse to comply with the order. And the attorney often will comply
rather than risk contempt, even if contempt would secure an immediate
appeal for the client.
27. See, e.g., Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
28. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation U.S. Attorney Matter No. 89-4-8881-J, 921 F.2d
1184, 1186 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1991); In re Hampers, 651 F.2d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1981).
29. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 761 (noting that the contempt option "has proved to be
somewhat haphazard in practice.").
30. See generally 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3914.23, at 140 and § 3917, at 376; see
also Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936) ("The rule is settled in this Court that except in
connection with an appeal from a final judgment or decree, a party to a suit may not review upon appeal
an order fining or imprisoning him for the commission of a civil contempt."); Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S.
217, 220 (1932) (holding that non-parties can immediately appeal from findings of civil contempt); In re
Christensen Eng'g Co., 194 U.S. 458, 461 (1904) (holding that a party may immediately appeal a
finding of criminal contempt). I put a pin, for now, in whether this distinction is material or makes any
sense. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78.
31. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 761.
32. See Thomas J. Andre, Jr., The Final-judgment rule and Party Appeals of Civil Contempt
Orders: Timefor a Change, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1041 (1980).
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In this latter scenario, the second special exception for discovery
orders-the Perlman exception-applies. This exception allows a
privilege claimant to immediately appeal a discovery order directed to a
disinterested third party. 33 In Perlman itself, the Supreme Court
allowed Perlman to appeal an order directing the clerk of a district court
to give a district attorney documents Perlman had deposited with the
clerk. 34 Perlman claimed that disclosure would violate his Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights, but he could not expect the clerk to stand in
contempt just so Perlman could immediately appeal the order. 35 So the
Court let him take an immediate appeal, noting that he was "powerless
to avert the mischief of the order."
Until 2009, a few courts of appeals allowed one additional avenue for
the immediate appeal of discovery orders. These courts had held that
discovery orders adverse to a claimed privilege were immediately
appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 37 (The collateral order
doctrine is a judge-made exception to the final-judgment rule that allows
for the immediate appeal of orders that are conclusive, separate from the
merits, and effectively unreviewable after a final judgment.3 8 ) These
courts reasoned that the potential loss of confidentiality warranted an
immediate appeal; once privileged material is disclosed--or as often
said, once the "cat was out of the bag"--its secrecy could never be
restored.39 These courts thus allowed immediate appeals of certain
discovery orders to allow some appellate review before secrecy was
irrevocably lost.
The Supreme Court abrogated this line of cases in Mohawk
Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter,holding that discovery orders adverse to a

claimed privile e were not immediately appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. 0 The Court determined that "postjudgment appeals
generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and assure the vitality

33. 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
34. Id.
at 13.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 621 (D.C. Cir. 2003); In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d
Cir. 1997). The majority of circuits had held that these orders were not appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. See Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 750 (10th Cir. 1993); Texaco Inc. v. La.
Land & Exploration Co., 995 F.2d 43, 43 (5th Cir. 1993); Chase Manhattan Bank, NA v. Turner &
Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1992); Reise v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 957 F.2d
293, 295 (7th Cir. 1992); Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
38. See generally Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 106 (2009); Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
39. See Napster, 479 F.3d at 1088; PhilipMorris, 314 F.3d at 617; FordMotor, 110 F.3d at 95.
40. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 106.
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of the attorney-client privilege. '

41

The Court also emphasized that

privilege claimants already had several avenues for seeking immediate
review of discovery orders, including certified appeals under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), writs of mandamus, and the contempt option. 42 Due to these
existing means of seeking immediate review, the Court thought it
unnecessary to also allow discovery appeals under the collateral order
doctrine.4 3
C. Post-Mohawk Developments

For the past several decades, the courts of appeals have applied
Perlman broadly. Although Perlman itself involved an appeal in the
grand-jury context, most courts of appeals had held that Perlman

appeals also were available in civil and criminal cases. 4 4 And the courts
made no distinctions based on the party-status

of the privilege

claimant-anyone claiming a privilege, whether a party or non-party,
45
could appeal a discovery order directed to a disinterested third party.
The Mohawk decision sparked two developments in Perlman appeals.
First, several courts have considered whether Mohawk overruled

Perlman.46 They've held that it didn't, and rightfully

SO.47

Mohawk

41. Id.at 109.
42. Id.at 110-11.
43. Id. at 110 ("[W]ere attorneys and clients to reflect upon their appellate options, they would
find that
litigants confronted with a particularly injurious or novel privilege ruling have several potential
avenues of review apart from collateral order appeal.").
44. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 749 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Thompson, 562 F.3d 387, 389 (D.C.Cir. 2009); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum,439 F.3d 740, 743 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 2005); see also In re Air Crash at
Belle Harbor, 490 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that Perlman "applies to appeals from orders
issued in both grand jury proceedings and criminal and civil actions" (internal citations omitted)). Only
the Tenth Circuit seems to limit Perlman appeals to the grand jury context. See, e.g., United States v.
Copar Pumice Co., 714 F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir. 2013) ("This circuit has narrowly interpreted
Perlman to apply in criminal grand jury proceedings ....");see also In re Motor Fuel Temperature
Sales Practice Litigation, 641 F.3d 470, 485 (10th Cir. 2011) ("We are aware of no case . .. that extends
Perlman beyond criminal grand jury proceedings. We decline to do so here.").
45. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 440 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the court
had jurisdiction to hear a Perlman appeal by a criminal defendant); United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d
1457, 1458 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1993) (same);
Ross, 423 F.3d at 599 (holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear a Perlman appeal by a civil
defendant); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 459-60 (1st Cir. 2000) (same);
Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear
a Perlman appeal by a civil plaintiff); Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 399 F.3d 391, 400 (1st Cir.
2005) (holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear a Perlman appeal by a non-party).
46. See, e.g., Doe, 749 F.3d at 1006; Holt-Orsted v. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 238 (6th Cir.
2011); United States v. Krane, 625 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2010); see also In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d
133, 145 (3d Cir. 2012) ("The Government argues that [Mohawk] narrows the traditionally understood
scope of the Perlman doctrine to instances where effective postjudgment review is unavailable.");
Wilson v. O'Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Mohawk Industries calls Perlman and its
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neither discussed nor cited Perlman.4 8 And the two decisions are not
inconsistent. The collateral order doctrine and Perlman appeals are
distinct exceptions to the final-judgment rule. They are different
doctrinal avenues to similar destinations.49 Mohawk dealt with only
one: the collateral order doctrine. To hold that one cannot immediately
appeal a discovery order under the collateral order doctrine says nothing
about the entirely separate Perlman doctrine.
Second, several courts addressing Perlman appeals after Mohawk

have cut back on Perlman'sscope, ultimately holding that parties can no
longer take Perlman appeals. 50 This development has been somewhat
circuitous and requires a bit of explanation.
It all began with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Wilson v.
O'Brien.5 1 Ruminating on the scope of Perlman after Mohawk, the

Wilson court declared that "[o]nly when the person who asserts a
privilege is a non-litigant will an appeal from the final decision be
inadequate." 52 And it based that conclusion largely on the Supreme
Court's statement in Mohawk that "whether [a discovery] order is
directed against a litigant or a third party, an appeal from the final

successors into question because, whether the order is directed against a litigant or a third party, an
appeal from the final decision will allow review of the district court's ruling. Only when the person
who asserts the privilege is a non-litigant will an appeal from the final decision be inadequate.").
47. See Doe, 449 F.3d at 1007. But see In re Naranjo, 768 F.3d 332, 343 n.14 (4th Cir. 2014)
("Perlman may no longer provide a viable rule in light of the Supreme Court's more recent decision in
[Mohawk].").
48. The briefing before the Supreme Court made only minor mention of Perlman. Mohawk
Industries' cert-stage reply brief mentioned Perlman in distinguishing a case. See Reply Brief at 2, n.2,
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (No. 08-678), 2009 WL 52074. Carpenter's
brief on the merits mentioned Perlman as one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement that
targets of discovery orders stand in contempt if they want to immediately appeal. See Brief for
Respondent at 13-14, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (No. 08-678), 2009 WL
1965294, at **13-14. And a merits-stage amicus brief mentioned Perlman as an alternative avenue for
appealing a discovery order. See Brief of Forner Article III Judges and Law Professors as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 23 n.14, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (No. 08678), 2009 WL 2040423. Perlman was not mentioned during oral argument.
49. See Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 146 ("[The Perlman doctrine and the collateral order doctrine
recognize separate exceptions to the general rule of finality under § 1291."); Holt-Orstead, 641 F.3d at
239 ("[The collateral order doctrine and the Perlman exception have historically been viewed as
discrete jurisdictional bases for immediate appeal."); Krane, 625 F.3d at 572 (same). Some First Circuit
decisions, however, have expressed some confision about whether Perlman and the collateral order
doctrine are distinct exceptions to the final-judgment rule. See Gill, 399 F.3d at 397-98; Ogden, 202
F.3d at 459.
50. See Copar Pumice, 714 F.3d at 1200; Holt-Orsted,641 F.3d at 238-39; Krane 625 F.3d at
572-73; see also Wilson, 621 F.3d at 643.
51. Wilson, 621 F.3d at 642. Wilson involved an interlocutory appeal from an order directing
one of Wilson's former attorneys to disclose information at a deposition. See id. at 642. The attorney
was actually a law student when he assisted Wilson; Wilson had recently had his conviction for murder
set aside with the help of the law student and others. See id.
52. Id.
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decision will allow review of the district court's ruling." 53 The Wilson
court never actually held that parties can no longer take Perlman
grounds. 54
appeals, sidestepping the matter to decide the case on other

But it laid the groundwork for cutting back on Perlman.
Next came the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Krane,
which also did not expressly hold that parties can no longer take
Perlman appeals. 55 In Krane, a client appealed a discovery order

directed to its former attorneys, claimin§ that the information was
The court held that the
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
client could take a Perlman appeal, emphasizing that "neither the

documents [were]
privilege holder nor the custodian of the relevant
' 57

parties to the underlying criminal proceedings."
Finally, the Sixth Circuit held in Holt-Orsted v. City of Dickson that
parties could no longer take Perlman appeals. 58 In Holt-Orsted, the

plaintiffs' former attorneys had been ordered to testify over a claim of
The Sixth Circuit quoted Krane at length

attorney-client privilege.

and emphasized the Ninth Circuit's observation that neither the privilege
holder nor the custodian in Krane were parties.

The Holt-Orsted court

speculated that "[g]oing forward, application of the Perlman doctrine

likely [would] be limited to such situations." 6 1 Because the privilege
claimants in Holt-Orstedwere parties, the court held that they could not
take a Perlman appeal. They could instead "ultimately . . . avail
themselves of a post-judgment appeal which, under Mohawk, suffices

'to protect the rights of the litigants and preserve the vitality of the
attorney-client privilege.'

62

Other courts of appeals have followed suit.63 Given the unanimity
53. Id.
54. See id. The court held that because the attorney had already disclosed the information, the
appeal was moot. See id. This was correct. See infra note 148. But it reflects an internal inconsistency
in the Wilson opinion. The appeal was moot because the harm against which a Perlman appeal
protects-wrongful disclosure-had already occurred. But if the purpose of a Perlman appeal is to
allow some appellate review before disclosure (which it is, see infra Part IlIl.A), then the party or nonparty status of the privilege claimant is largely irrelevant, see infra Part III.B.
55. United States v. Krane, 625 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2010).
56. Id. at 570-71.
57. Id. at 573.
58. Holt-Orsted v. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 240-41 (6th Cir. 2011).
59. Id. at 232-33.
60. Id. at 240.
61. Id. at 239.
62. Id. at 240 (quoting Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 109 (2009)).
63. See United States v. Copar Pumice Co., 714 F.3d 1197, 1207-09 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Because
Defendants, as civil litigants, have other review available, they cannot immediately appeal the discovery
orders at issue under the Perlman doctrine."); see also In re Naranjo, 768 F.3d 332, 343 n.14 (4th Cir.
2014) (citing Copar Pumice and noting that "Mohawk might be read to say that interlocutory appeals
concerning the discovery of privileged documents should not be permitted when the privilege-holder has
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with which these courts have suggested or held that parties can no
longer take Perlman appeals, future cases likely will reach the same
conclusion.
III. PERLMAN APPEALS AFTER MOHAWK
The courts of appeals' recent cutting back on Perlman appeals is
mistaken and reflects a misunderstanding of Perlman's purpose.
Perlman appeals, like contempt appeals, exist to offer some chance at
appellate review before the disclosure of confidential information. In
other words, they protect against the harm of wrongful disclosure. This
harm is largely the same regardless of party status. Little reason thus
exists to treat parties and non-parties differently in the Perlman context.
A. The Purposeof Perlman Appeals
Exceptions to the final-judgment rule reflect a judgment that, in a
particular situation, the benefits of an immediate appeal outweigh the
costs. 64 So to understand the purpose of Perlman appeals, one must
look to why the appealability balance is struck differently in the
Perlman context.
Again, the Perlman doctrine allows privilege
claimants to appeal discovery orders directed at a disinterested third
party. Perlman appeals thus exist to allow some appellate review of a
potentially erroneous privilege ruling.
Erroneous privilege rulings can impose two types of harm. The first
is straightforward: the wrongful use of privileged information in
litigation. Privileged information is, generally speaking, not admissible
evidence.65 So when a district court overrules a claim of privilege, the
information then becomes evidence to be used by the parties. This
evidence can prolong litigation. It could, for example, be the basis for
denying a motion for summary judgment, requiring a trial that would
have been avoided had the evidence been inadmissible. The privileged
information could also cause a jury to reach a verdict it wouldn't have
reached without the information. Ineither case, the erroneous privilege
ruling harms someone by extending litigation or resulting in an
erroneous judgment.
other means to protect his privilege rights."). The Tenth Circuit's statement in Copar Pumice was
somewhat superfluous, as that court allows Perlman appeals only from grand jury proceedings. See
Copar Pumice, 714 F.3d at 1207; see also In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practice Litigation, 641
F.3d 470, 485 (10th Cir. 2011). Copar Pumice was a civil case, so the court had no reason to reach this
matter.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14.
65. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not specify privileges, instead leaving their development
to the courts. See FED. R. EvID. 501.
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The second potential harm from an erroneous privilege rulin§ comes
from wrongful disclosure. 66 Privileged information is secret. 7 And

maintaining that secrecy has its own social value independent of any
litigation. In attorney-client relationships, for example, the promise of
secrecy ensures that clients can speak openly with their attorneys, which
in turn leads to proper legal advice and (we hope) law-abiding

behavior. 68 The secrecy of privileged communications also furthers
privacy interests, as can be seen in the spousal-communications
privilege.
Although this privilege theoretically encourages open
communication between spouses, few would seriously argue that it has
such an effect. 69 A much more compelling rationale for the privilege is
that a majority of society has deemed certain matters private and
unseemly to inquire into.
When a court orders disclosure of that
information over a claim of privilege, the claimant loses the secrecy that
information once had. This loss is real. And once lost, secrecy cannot
be regained. 71
The first harm of erroneous discovery orders-use of the information

during proceedings-does not require an immediate appeal. To be sure,
the wrongful use of privileged information to prolong litigation or win a

judgment imposes costs. These costs, however, are little different from
those imposed by all sorts of erroneous district court decisions.

If a

district court erroneously denies a motion to dismiss, the movant must
then proceed to ultimately unnecessary discovery.

Any wrongful

evidentiary ruling, not just those on privilege, can lead to an
66. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 739-40.
67. Federal communications privileges-such as the attorney-client privilege, the spousalcommunications privilege, and the psychotherapist-patient-privilege-require that the communication in
question be confidential. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §
5.13, at 334-40 (5th ed. 2012) (attorney-client privilege); id. at § 5.32, at 420-21 (spousal
communications privilege); id. at § 5.35, at 428 (psychotherapist-patient privilege).
If the
communication wasn't confidential when made, there is no privilege. See, e.g., id. at § 5.13, at 336-37
("[A communication] is not considered confidential if the client intended that the communication be
later disclosed either publicly or to particular outsiders."). And if the privilege holder ceases to keep the
communication confidential, the communication loses its privilege. See, e.g., id. at § 5.13, at 338.
68. E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("[The attorney-client
privilege's] purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration ofjustice. The
privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or
advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client."); see also Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
69. The Supreme Court appeared to invoke this rationale in Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7,
14 (1934) ("The basis of the immunity given to communications between husband and wife is the
protection of marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage
relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of justice which the privilege
entails.").
70. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 68, at § 5.32, at 416.
71. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 739.
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unnecessary trial or reversible verdict.
But courts have determined that appeal after a final judgment suffices
for most of these orders. The benefits of generally delaying appeal until
after a final judgment are thought to outweigh the costs imposed on
individual litigants in specific circumstances. 72 And that's probably
correct; many district court orders have some bearing on whether
litigation continues. Were all such decisions immediately appealable as
of right, the courts of appeals likely would face a deluge of burdensome
and often unnecessary appeals. 73 Absent some special circumstances,
privilege claimants don't need to be entitled to an immediate appeal to
address the wrongful use of privileged information.
The second harm---disclosure-is different. Wrongful disclosure
never can be remedied due to the loss of secrecy. If an appellate court is
ever to prevent the harm of wrongful disclosure, it must do so
immediately, before disclosure of the privileged information. As a
result, the risk of that harm74is considered sufficient to allow for some
immediate appellate review.
Hence, contempt appeals and Perlman appeals. Both exist to allow

some opportunity for appellate review before disclosure. When a court
orders a privilege claimant to disclose potentially confidential
information, the claimant has the contempt option. When a court orders
a disinterested third party to disclose potentially confidential
information, the claimant can take a Perlman appeal. These two types
of appeals complement one another. They accordingly have the same
purpose: ensuring some appellate review before privileged information
is disclosed and secrecy irrevocably lost.

72. See Lammon, supra note 1, at 429.
73. Note, I suspect such a deluge would occur if these orders were appealable as of right.
Whether a system of discretionary appeals would result in a similar deluge is unclear; discretionadvocates and rule-advocates disagree over discretion's likely effect on appellate caseloads, and we lack
sufficient evidence at this point to determine who is right. See id. at 433-34.
74. The distinction between the harm of use and the harm of disclosure is analogous to the
distinction between the right to avoid liability and the right to avoid litigation in the collateral order
doctrine context. Courts have regularly deemed immunities from suit-which protect someone from the
costs and burdens of litigation itself, not just from an eventual judgment-can be immediately appealed
under that doctrine. See, e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
144-45 (1993) (permitting appeals from the denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527-30 (1985) (permitting appeals from the denial of qualified immunity for
government officials); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-08 (1979) (permitting appeals from the
denial of Speech & Debate Clause immunity); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)
(permitting appeals from the denial immunity from double jeopardy). The whole point of the immunity
is to protect the claimant from the burdens of litigation. So if a trial court wrongfully denies a claim of
immunity, an appeal after final judgment is useless. In contrast, defenses against liability generally
cannot be immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 884 (1994); Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 500-01
(1989). Thanks to Andrew Pollis for pointing out this analogy.
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B. The Irrelevancy of Party/Non-PartyStatus
Given their identity of purpose, contempt appeals and Perlman should
be treated the same. In the contempt context, both parties and nonparties are allowed (with one exception discussed momentarily) to take
contempt appeals. And rightfully so. A privilege claimant's interest in
appealing a denial of privilege is largely the same whether the claimant
is a party or non-party. In either case, the privilege claimant simply
seeks review before disclosure; when the claimant seeks to maintain
confidentiality, an appeal after disclosure is just as useless to parties as it
is to non-parties.
Perlman appeals are little different. Whether a party or non-party, the
privilege claimant does not control disclosure and thus cannot take a
contempt appeal. Just as in contempt appeals, the claimant seeks some
appellate review before disclosure. And just as in contempt appeals, the
privilege claimant's interest in an immediate appeal is largely the same
whether the claimant is a party or non-party. An appeal after disclosure
is useless to them both.
To be sure, some differences between parties and non-parties exist in
this context. First and most obviously, parties can appeal after a final
judgment; non-parties generally cannot. It is for this reason that the
courts of appeals have begun cutting back on parties' ability to take a
Perlman appeal 7 5 But the distinction is irrelevant in this context. Party
or non-party, the privilege claimants seek to avoid the harm of wrongful
disclosure. And party or non-party, an appeal after a final judgment
does nothing to remedy that harm. An appeal can, of course, address the
wrongful use of privileged information. But any existing secrecy has
been lost forever. That's precisely why courts have both the contempt
option and Perlman appeals.
When privilege claimants control
disclosure, they can secure review before disclosure with the contempt
option; when they don't, they have Perlman. Given the purpose of these
appeals, a party's ability to appeal after a final judgment is immaterial.
Second, contempt appeals do not treat parties and non-parties
identically: non-parties can immediately appeal from findings of both
civil and criminal contempt, while parties can appeal only from findings
of criminal contempt. 76 The rationale for this different treatment is not
clear. Indeed, "[tihe distinction that permits parties to appeal a criminal
contempt order but not a civil contempt order does not have any obvious
functional justification in regulating relationships between district courts
and courts of appeals with respect to discovery orders." 77 Despite
75. See supraPart I.C.
76. See supra text accompanying note 28.
77. 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3914.23, at 146; see also Andre, supra note 32.
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continuing criticism that there's no practical reason for it, the distinction
seems to be entrenched.
But this distinction between parties and non-parties in the contempt
context should not affect the availability of Perlman appeals. For one,
the distinction makes little practical sense; it should be abandoned, not
used as a reason for restricting Perlman appeals. Even with this
distinction, parties still can take some contempt appeals; they are not
denied them entirely, but only when the contempt is civil. The contempt
option's awkward distinction between parties and non-parties thus
provides little reason for denying Perlmanappeals to parties.
Third, contempt appeals have a built-in limiter that Perlman appeals
don't. Contempt appeals impose a cost beyond the normal cost of
appealing on the appellant: the cost of a contempt citation, which can
include substantial fines or jail time. 78 This penalty is thought to
discourage unnecessary appeals-those that have little merit or are
brought to delay proceedings or harass the other side-and thus limit the
contempt option's impact on appellate caseloads. 79 (Concern over
increasing appellate caseloads is always a consideration in defining the
scope of interlocutory appeals.) 80 Perlman appeals don't have that cost;
the appellant is not at risk of fines or jail time. So Perlman lacks the
built-in limiter of contempt appeals.
This difference is meaningful. But it ultimately does not justify
denying Perlman appeals to parties. If the concern is appellate
caseloads, then what matters is whether allowing non-parties and parties
to take Perlman appeals will increase caseloads. This question is an
empirical one, and we can't be certain of the answer. 81 But if history is
any indicator, the concern is misplaced. Until recently, both parties and
non-parties could take Perlman appeals. And there has never been any
suggestion that Perlman appeals were overwhelming the courts of
appeals. These appeals are not terribly common. And Perlman appeals
by parties make up only a fraction of them; most involve privilege
claimants in grand
jury proceedings, where there are no parties besides
82
the government.
78. See Andre, supranote 32, at 1084-1100.
79. See, e.g., In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 1985) ("(The contempt option] ensures that
people raise only those claims that are sufficiently serious that they are willing to make a sacrifice to
obtain appellate review. Self-interest cuts down dramatically on the number of appeals taken to obtain
delay.").
80. See Lammon, supra note I, at 433-36 (describing the widespread concern in the appellate
jurisdiction literature over increasing caseloads).
81. Cf id. at 433-36 (noting the lack of data on the impact various appellate rules might have on
caseloads).
82. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 745 F.3d 681 (3d Cir. 2014); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 709 F.3d 1027 (10th Cir. 2013); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 561 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2009);
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Fourth, parties taking contempt or Perlman appeals could-at least in
theory-disrupt trial court proceedings more than similar appeals by
non-parties. The argument would be that by shifting their focus to an
immediate appeal, parties would give less time, effort, and attention to
the trial court proceedings, thereby slowing them down. Such an impact
on trial court proceedings is plausible. But its extent-or even if it
exists-is unknown.
Some of these differences should cause some pause in treating parties
and non-parties alike. But none of them ultimately overcome the near
identity of interests that parties and non-parties share in contempt and
Perlman appeals.
C. Mohawk Didn't Change Things
Why, then, have several courts of appeals concluded that Mohawk
limited Perlman appeals to non-parties? A few explanations are
possible.
1. Taking Statements Out of Context
First, this might all be a case of misunderstanding stemming largely
from courts taking statements in previous opinions out of context. For
example, Wilson v. O'Brien-the Seventh Circuit case that started the
restricting of Perlman-statedthat "[o]nly when the person who asserts
a privilege is a non-litigant will an appeal from the final decision be
inadequate. ' ' 3 The Sixth and Tenth Circuits relied on this statement in
concluding that parties can no longer take Perlman appeals. 84 But the
Wilson court wasn't actually addressing whether parties could take
Perlman appeals when it made that statement. The court was instead
discussing whether the targets of discovery orders can take an
immediate appeal without first being held in contempt. 85 Before
Mohawk, the Seventh Circuit had held that they could, 6 which was
inconsistent with. the normal rule that the target of a discovery order
must use the contempt option to take an immediate appeal. The Wilson
court surmised that Mohawk might have abrogated these decisions, but it

In re Grand Jury, 490 F.3d 978 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In re Witness Before Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288
F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002).
83. Wilson v. O'Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2010).
84. See United States v. Copar Pumice Co., 714 F.3d 1197, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2013); HoltOrsted v. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 238 (6th Cir. 2011).
85. See Wilson, 621 F.3d at 642.
86. See Burden-Meeks v. Welch, 319 F.3d 897, 900-01 (7th Cir. 2003); Dellwood Farms, Inc. v.
Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1997).
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87
ultimately avoided the issue by deciding the case on other grounds.
So Wilson might be read as addressing only whether the targets of
discovery orders could immediately appeal without a finding of
contempt. Such a reading means that subsequent cases simply have
misunderstood Wilson. This is admittedly not an entirely satisfactory
explanation, as the court's statement that only non-litigants needed an
appeal before a final judgment seems quite categorical. Other courts
have taken it as such.
The Supreme Court's statement in Mohawk that "postjudgment
appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and assure the
8
vitality of the attorney-client privilege" has received similar treatment.
This line, too, must be read in context. In concluding that a privilege
claimant could not immediately appeal an adverse discovery order under
the collateral order doctrine, the Mohawk Court emphasized the
alternative avenues for immediate review, which (according to the
Court) rendered appeals under the collateral order doctrine
unnecessary. 89 These alternatives included certified appeals under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b)6 writs of mandamus, and the previously discussed
contempt option.
The contempt option thus was part of the reason why the Supreme
Court concluded that appeals after a final judgment generally suffice for
parties. Privilege claimants in this situation have means to seek
immediate review-including the contempt option-when appeal after a
final judgment won't suffice. Perlman is, of course, the stand-in for
contempt appeals when the contempt route is unavailable. So the
availability of Perlman appeals actually supports the reasoning in
Mohawk. To use that holding to then cut back on Perlman is perverse.

2. Disfavoring Judge-Made Exceptions
Another potential explanation is the Supreme Court's general hostility
for judge-made exceptions to the final-judgment rule. The Mohawk
Court did not speak highly of them. 9 1 And in Mohawk and elsewhere,
the Court has suggested that rulemaking is the appropriate method for
creating exceptions to the final-judgment rule. 92 Concurring in

87. 621 F.3d at 642-43.
88. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 109 (2009); see also United States v. Copar
Pumice Co., 714 F.3d 1197, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 2013); Holt-Orsted v. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230,
240 (6th Cir. 2011).
89. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 110-11.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 113-14.
92. See id.; Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35,42 (1995).
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Mohawk, Justice Thomas suggested that the Court draw a line in the
sand and hold that courts could create no more exceptions. 93 Most have
read Mohawk as discouraging any more judge-made 94exceptions to the
final-judgment rule, if not foreclosing them altogether.
But the Supreme Court's general attitude toward judge-made
exceptions to the final-judgment rule is just that-a general attitude.
Were we writing on a clean slate, it would have some influence. And in
a case of uncertainty-when the arguments for and against recognizing a
new judge-made exception are in equipoise-it could resolve the tie.
Relying on this general attitude to cut back on existing judge-made
exceptions, however, would be a mistake. A preference for rulemaking
suggests that the judge-made exceptions should be codified. If that's the
case, courts should not start dismantling the current system of judgemade exceptions before its replacement exists. To do so will only create
further uncertainty and complexity in this area. There might be good
reasons to cut back on a judge-made exception to the final-judgment
rule. But a general hostility to such exceptions isn't one of them.
3. Overlooking Perlman's Purpose and the Challenge of Perlman More
Generally
A more fundamental problem with the recent decisions cutting back
on Perlman is a failure to recognize Perlman's purpose. These courts
determined that an appeal after a final judgment is just as good as an
immediate one. But again, that makes sense only if the harm to be
addressed is that of wrongful use. If the harm is wrongful disclosure, an
immediate appeal is necessary. And that's why the courts have created
both contempt and Perlman appeals.
This explanation simply raises another question: why have these
courts overlooked Perlman'spurpose?
I suspect that the answer lies in the fact that the courts facing this
issue had no convenient source to which they could turn for help in
93. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
94. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Keeps Tight Limits on Interlocutory Review, TRIAL (Mar.
2010), 52, 54 ("[Mohawk] shows that little, if anything, will be found to fit within the collateral order
exception that the Court recognized in Cohen."); James E. Pfander, Iqbal and Constitutional Torts:
Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in ConstitutionalLitigation, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV.
1387, 1404 (2010) ("[T]he Court [in Mohawk] ... suggested that it would no longer adopt judge-made
expansions of the collateral order doctrine."); James E. Pfander & David R. Pekarek Krohn,
Interlocutory Review by Agreement of the Parties:A PreliminaryAnalysis, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1043,
1053 (2011); Rory Ryan, Luke Meier & Jeremy Counseller, Interlocutory Review of Orders Denying
Remand Motions, 63 BAYLOR L. REv. 734, 776 (2011) (suggesting that after Mohawk, "little room
exists for the [collateral order] doctrine's expansion"). But see Scott Dodson, The Complexity of
Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REv. 1, 42 (2011) ("[Tlhe Court [in Mohawk] has left open the
possibility that other nonfmal decisions might be deemed final.").
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addressing it. Grasping Perlman's purpose and its interaction with
Mohawk might be difficult without reading through many of the
decisions discussing Perlman. In the nearly 100 years since the
Supreme Court decided Perlman, the courts of appeals have issued
hundreds of opinions citing it.95 No court should be expected to read
even a significant number of them. With their high caseloads, federal
appellate judges and their staffs rarely have the luxury of time for deep
study into all the issues that come before these. 96 Study of even a
significant number of these decisions might not have
97 been enough;
rare.
exceedingly
are
purpose
Perlman's
of
discussions
One place to which the courts might have turned was the literature on
interlocutory appeals. But Perlman has received short shrift in that
literature. 98 So all the courts could do, and all we can reasonably expect
them to do, was to try and reach some reasonable conclusion regarding
Perlman's scope. The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Mohawk that
appeals after a final judgment suffice for parties-when taken out of
context-seemed to provide a convenient basis for deciding the cases.
D. Fixing Perlman through Caselaw or Codification

The recent and mistaken curbing of Perlman's scope can be fixed in
three ways. First, the courts of appeals could reverse course and fix the
issue themselves. Second, given the appropriate opportunity, the
95. Over 200 courts of appeals decisions cite Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
96. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 205 (2008) ("No [generalist judge] can be an
expert in more than a small fraction of the fields of law that generate the appeals he must decide, or can
devote enough time to an individual case to make himself, if only for the moment . , . , an expert in the
field out of which the case arises.); see also id. at 206 ("A judge is a generalist who writes an opinion
under the pressure of time in whatever case, in whatever field of law, is assigned to him.").
97. See In re Nat'l Mortg. Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates Litig., 821 F.2d 1422, 1424
(9th Cir. 1987) ("Perlman applies only if its application will prevent the disclosure of privileged
information. If the third party has already disclosed the information, the reason for expedited review no
longer exists."); see also United States v. Lavender, 583 F.2d 630, 633 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that the
need for a Perlman appeal disappears after disclosure).
98. Moore's FederalPracticeoffers what is probably the deepest discussion of Perlman. See 19
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 202.11[2][a], at 202-79-202-83 (3d ed. 2015). Wright, Miller, and
Cooper also discuss Perlman. See 15B WRIGHT,MILLER & COOPER, supra note 12, § 3914.23, at 15671. Much of that discussion focuses, however, on determining whether a third party is actually
"disinterested"; its mention of Perlman's purpose is somewhat vague. See id. at 155-56 (noting that a
"desire to provide some opportunity for appeal from discovery orders" for persons not bound by a
discovery order "led to the 'Perlman' doctrine"). Most articles on interlocutory appeals mention
Perlman (if at all) only briefly. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 15, at 190-91; Petty, supra note 1,at 37374. The only pieces focusing on Perlman are student notes. See Linda Hylenski, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Perlman Rule-Should the Nature of the Relationship Determine the Scope of the
Rule?, I DET. C. L. REv. 163 (1985); Michael R. Lazerwitz, The Perlman Exception: Limitations
Required by the Final Decision Rule, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 798 (1982); Matthew 0. Wagner, Fixing
Perlman: How the Misapplication of a 100-Year-Old Doctrine Threatens to Undermine Mohawk
Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 79 U. CIN. L. REv. 1631 (2011).
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Supreme Court could step in and overrule this development.
The third option is codification. The Appellate Rules Committee is
closer now than it has been in some time to codifying the judge-made
exceptions to the final judgment rule. Should it do so, Perlman could
provide the basis for a valuable rule.
Thinking about codifying Perlman, however, reveals a wealth of
questions about codifying the judge-made exceptions more generally.
The very reasons why the courts had difficulty with Perlman-the
immensity of the caselaw and the incomplete discussion of the doctrine
in the literature-arise with several exceptions to the final-judgment
rule. If codification is to succeed, further work on interlocutory appeals
must be done. I turn now to the challenges codification presents and
how legal scholarship might address these challenges.
IV. CODIFYING INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS

A. Complexity, Criticism,and Codification
The current system of appellate jurisdiction-a general finaljudgment rule with a variety of exceptions-is both large and
complex.9 9 It has a wealth of exceptions scattered across the U.S. Code,
rules of procedure, and judicial decisions. All of these exceptions have
different requirements and apply in different contexts. Some are appeals
as of right,
while others are discretionary.10 1 Some exceptions have
quite clear requirements. 102 Others, less so. 03 And some are about as
99. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 165-66 (Summer 1984) (noting "the unconscionable intricacy of the existing
law, depending as it does on overlapping exceptions, each less lucid than the next"); Edward H. Cooper,
Timing as Jurisdiction:FederalCivil Appeals in Context, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 157 (Summer
1984) ("The final judgment requirement has been supplemented by a list of elaborations, expansions,
evasions, and outright exceptions that is dazzling in its complexity."); Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note
14, at 291 (calling the current system "arcane and confusing"); Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra
note 15, at 1651 (noting the "labrynthian conglomeration of jurisdictional rules"); Maurice Rosenberg,
Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 172 (Summer
1984) ("The existing federal finality-appealability situation is an unacceptable morass."); Melissa A.
Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure:Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass
Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REv. 527, 556 (2002) (noting the "dizzying array of statutory and judicially-created
[finality] exceptions").
100. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (orders denying arbitration).
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(0.
102. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(o, for example, is relatively straightforward. It gives the
courts of appeals discretion to hear an immediate appeal "from an order granting or denying class-action
certification." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f). But even this relatively clear rule contains some ambiguity at the
margins. See, e.g., Matz v. Household International Tax Reduction Investment Plan, 687 F.3d 824, 826
(7th Cir. 2012) (addressing whether an order modifying the scope of a previously certified class is
appealable under Rule 23(0); Fleischman v. Albany Medical Center, 639 F.3d 28, 31 (2nd Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (addressing whether an order denying a motion to amend a class certification order revives
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vague as a legal rule can be. 104 Some exceptions apply in only specific
106
contexts, I5 while others can be invoked in nearly any type of case.
of caselaw addressing all of these exceptions is
And the 10body
7
immense.
All this complexity breeds uncertainty and seemingly wasteful
litigation over the appealability of district court orders. lo8 So the current
the time for taking a Rule 23(0 appeal).
103. The collateral order doctrine often has been criticized for having unclear requirements. See,
e.g., 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3911, at 330 (noting the several Supreme Court decisions
that "alternately support and twist or ignore the pronounced elements of the [collateral order] doctrine");
Lloyd C. Anderson, The CollateralOrder Doctrine: A New "Serbonian Bog " and FourProposalsfor
Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 539, 540 (1998) (arguing that the collateral order doctrine is built on
"inconsistent [Supreme Court] opinions" that "caus[e] unacceptable confusion over which nonfinal
rulings are appealable"); Kristin B. Gerdy, "Important" and "Irreversible" but Maybe Not
"Unreviewable": The Dilemma of Protecting Defendants' Rights Through the Collateral Order
Doctrine, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 213, 246, 248 (2004) (characterizing a recent collateral order decision as
"less than consistent and even contradictory of earlier iterations of the doctrine" and criticizing it for
threatening to expand the collateral order doctrine "beyond reason"); Glynn, supra note 15, at 205;
Steinman, supra note 2, at 1277 (characterizing the collateral order doctrine as "confus[ed] and
incoheren[t]"). Other exceptions have substantive requirements that inject some uncertainty into their
application, such as those for a certified appeal or a writ of mandamus. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(requiring that the district court order "involve[] a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion"); id. § 1651 (requiring that the district court patently err
and leave a party with no other effective remedy, see, e.g., Cheney v.U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367,
380-82 (2004)).
104. There seem to be no concrete requirements for taking a pragmatic appeal under Gillespie v.
United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); the decision of whether to allow such an appeal appears
largely discretionary. That being said, the Ninth Circuit has tried to make elements out of pragmatic
appeals. See Commissioner v. JT USA, LP, 630 F.3d 1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2011).
105. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (applies only in cases involving arbitration).
106. Extraordinary writs are available in essentially all cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Other
exceptions apply relatively broadly, such as those for appeals regarding injunctive relief and certified
appeals. See id. at § 1292(a)(1) (available whenever injunctive relief is sought); id. § 1292(b) (available
in any civil case).
107. While the Supreme Court has decided scores of cases involving judge-made exceptions to
the final-judgment rule, the courts of appeals have decided thousands. A Westlaw search of cases
mentioning the collateral order doctrine-the most common judge-made exception to the final-judgment
rule-retums over 5,000 court of appeals decisions. (The search terms were: ("COLLATERALORDER-DOCTRINE" (1291 /s COHEN) ("COLLATERAL-ORDER" /s JURISDICTION)
"COHEN-RULE"
"COHEN"COHEN-DOCTRINE"
"COLLATERAL-ORDER-RULE"
DOCTRINE")) Note, this number wouldn't include unpublished orders in which a court deems a district
court order not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Decisions on other judge-made
exceptions to the final-judgment rule, though not as prevalent, number in the hundreds. As noted above,
over 200 courts of appeals decisions cite Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). And over 340
courts of appeals decisions cite Gillespie, 379 U.S. 148, the central Supreme Court case for the
pragmatic finality exception to the final-judgment rule.
108. This is particularly true of the broader exceptions to the final-judgment rule. See Lammon,
supra note 1,at 431 ("The broader exceptions are much less predictable. They are plagued by vague
terms and inconsistent treatment in the courts, such that both litigants and judges spend far too much
time trying to determine what can be appealed and when."); see also Cooper, supra note 99, at 157
(arguing that even "[I]awyers and judges who are expert in working with the system.., often encounter
elusive uncertainty in seeking clear answers to many problems"); Luther T. Munford, Dangers, Toils,
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regime of interlocutory appeals has received substantial criticism and
calls for reform. 109 Indeed, critics have been calling for changes to the
current system of interlocutory appeals for decades. But little has
changed. Only two significant developments have occurred in the last
twenty years. First, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to define
by rule when district court orders are final and when they can be
appealed.1 10 Second, the Rules Committee used that authority to enact

Rule 23(f), which allows for appeals from district court orders granting
or denying class certification. '171

But things might be changing. Although it has not fully joined the
chorus of calls for reform, the Supreme Court recently chimed in on the
possibility of change. In Mohawk, the Court suggested that when it
comes to interlocutory appeals, judge-made exceptions are out and
112
rulemaking is in.
Rulemaking, the Mohawk Court noted, "draws on
the collective experience of bench and bar, and it facilitates the adoption
of measured, practical solutions."' 113
And so rulemaking--"not

expansion by court decision"-is now "the preferred means for
determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be
immediately appealable."114
Mohawk also has spurred some limited preliminary action by the
Appellate Rules Committee. The Committee has received two requests

to address the specific issue addressed in Mohawk-the appealability of
discovery orders adverse to a claim of attorney-client privilege."

5

In

September 2013, a memo from Andrea L. Kuperman, Chief Counsel to
the Committee, discussed some preliminary doctrinal research on
interlocutory appeals.116 And in October 2014, a memo from Professor
and Snares: Appeals Before Final Judgment, 15 LITIG. 18, 18 (Spring 1989) (noting that the
appealability regime "provides the kind of excursions into legal history and abstract analysis that can
drive practical litigators crazy"); Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 172 ("Entirely too much of the appellate
courts' energy is absorbed in deciding whether they are entitled under the finality principle and its
exceptions to hear cases brought before them-and explaining why or why not.").
109. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 15, at 258-67; Steinman, supra note 2, at 1276-94.
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) ("The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with
section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals
that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d)."); id. at § 2072(c) (authorizing
the Supreme Court to prescribe rules "defin[ing] when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes
of appeal under section 1291 of this title.").
11. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(o. For more in depth discussions of Rule 23(f), see generally Michael E.
Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certificationand Interlocutory
Review by the United States Courts of appeals Under Rule 2309, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1531 (2000).
112. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 110, 113-14 (2009).
113. Id. at 114 (internal citation omitted).
114. Id. at 113-14 (quoting Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)).
115. Minutes of the Spring 2014 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, supra
note 5, at 15.
116. See Andrea L. Kuperman, Memorandum re Immediate Appealability of Prejudgment Orders,
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Catherine T. Struve, Reporter to the Committee, discussed various
issues regarding appeals from
discovery orders adverse to a claim of
7
attorney-client privilege. "1
So the potential for reforming the current system of interlocutory
appeals appears greater than it has been in some time. That is not to say
reform is certain. One member of the Committee "stated that it would
be wildly unrealistic to attempt a global project to overhaul the
treatment of appealability of interlocutory orders.' ' 118
Another
Committee member proposed removing the issue from the Committee's
agenda entirely. 119 And the Committee has abandoned its efforts to
20
craft a rule regarding appeals from attorney-client privilege decisions. 1
But the Committee's preliminary steps toward potential codification
suggest that a realistic chance of reform currently exists.
As for the actual reform, critics of the current system generally have
split into one of two camps. 12 1 Some advocate for a system of
categorical rules defining what can be appealed and when. 1 2 Most
prefer switching to a system of discretionary appeals. 123 Under such a
system, the courts of appeals would have discretion to hear an
immediate appeal from nearly any district court order. Commentators
herald a discretionary system's flexibility and suggest that it would not
overwhelm appellate courts with a flood of interlocutory appeals. 124
Though an academic favorite, a wholesale switch to discretionary
appeals appears unlikely in the short (and perhaps even medium) term.
For one thing, discretion advocates don't seem to have the Supreme
Court on their side. Although the Court's preference for rulemaking
could conceivably mean rules allowing discretionary appeals, that is
probably not what it had in mind. 125 Moreover, the Committee's
in Agenda Book for the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, at 367 (Sept. 20, 2103),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/runles/Agenda%2OBooks/Appellate/20 14-04Appeals-Agenda-Book.pdf.
117. See Struve, supra note 5.
118. Minutes of the Spring 2014 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, supra
note 5, at 16.
119. See id.
120. See Draft Minutes of Fall 2014 Meeting, in Agenda Book for the Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules, at 25 (Apr. 23-24, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agendabooks/advisory-committee-rules-appellate-procedure-april-2015.
121. See Lammon, supranote 1, at 432-36 (discussing the two camps of reformers).
122. See Carrington, supra note 99, at 167-68; Glynn, supra note 15, at 259; Rosenberg, supra
note 99, at 179.
123. See Cooper, supra note 99, at 163-64; Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 14, at 293-302;
Martineau, supra note 1, at 748-87; John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of InterlocutoryAppeals
Jurisprudence with DiscretionaryReview, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 214-22 (1994); see also Redish, supra
note 18, at 124-27.
124. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 14, at 301-02; Martineau, supranote 1,at 788.
125. 1 suggest later on that an experiment with discretionary appeals might be a useful part of
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preliminary work has not indicated any consideration of entirely
discretionary appeals; the little work that has been done so far has
looked primarily to categories of appealable orders and a possible
categorical rule for attorney-client privilege rulings. 126 Perhaps most
importantly, a wholesale switch to discretionary appeals in federal court
might be too radical a change for the Committee or the federal courts in
general to swallow. Reform of interlocutory appeals in federal court
So whatever
the future prospects
near-glacial
pace.127
often
moves at aappeals,
they are
an unlikely
next step.
of discretionary
B. The Challenge of Codification
Practically speaking, any reform of the current system of
interlocutory appeals is thus likely to take the form of codifying
categorical rules. Such a system probably would leave in place the
existing statutory and rule-based exceptions to the final-judment rule.
But it would replace the judge-made exceptions with rules. 1 2
Even if discretion ultimately would be a superior system of appellate
jurisdiction, codification might still be an improvement over the current
regime. Codification could simplify and streamline this body of law and
make it more manageable. Courts could focus their attention on the
merits of a case rather than on issues of appellate jurisdiction. Litigants
also could benefit from the increased predictability of codification and
save time and money by litigating appellate jurisdiction less frequently.
For codification to succeed, more research into interlocutory appeals
is needed. The issue discussed above-the courts of appeals' recent
cutting back on Perlman's scope-is merely an example of a larger
problem. Just as the body of knowledge on Perlman appeals was
insufficient for the courts to correctly assess Mohawk's impact, the body
of knowledge on interlocutory appeals, as a whole, is insufficient for the
Committee to successfully codify the judge-made exceptions. Future
research must address at least two shortcomings in the existing research.
First, the existing literature on interlocutory appeals has not addressed
many discrete issues that arise in this area. Too much of the literature

codification. See infra Part I.D.
126. Kuperman's preliminary study of interlocutory appeals mentioned only two avenues for
codification: a larger project of "specify[ing] by rule the universe of interlocutory orders that should be
appealable" or a more narrow project of "considerfing] only the appealability of particular categories of
orders that are brought to the Committee's attention." Kuperman, supra note 116, at 1. Struve's memo
looked to appeals of attomey-client privilege orders. See Struve, supra note 5.
127. This is not unique to interlocutory appeal reform--"judicial reform is no sport for the short
winded." ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION xix (1949).
128. See generally Glynn, supranote 15.
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makes a global assessment of interlocutory appeals. 129 But interlocutory
appeals are lousy with narrow issues worth researching. (I give several
examples below, but more exist.) Before we can be confident in our
global assessment of the entire system, we require a better
understanding of its discrete workings. Some extremely valuable work0
13
on discrete issues of appellate jurisdiction already has been done.
Treatises-particularly the Edward H. Cooper-edited volumes of
Federal Practice and Procedure-provide a much deeper look into
many discrete issues of appellate jurisdiction. 131 Even so, more research
is needed.
Second, too much of the existing literature focuses primarilysometimes entirely-on the decisions of the Supreme Court. 132 The
courts of appeals are largely overlooked. 133 This focus presents a gap in
the knowledge of interlocutory appeals. At the very least, we should be
curious about what the courts of appeals are doing. After all, these
courts have the final say on many legal questions and are the court of
last resort for nearly all federal litigants. 34 So the Supreme Court's
decisions simply cannot capture all that is going on in the field of
interlocutory appeals.
Some of the more valuable research on
interlocutory appeals already takes a more court of appeals-focused
approach. 13 Future research should do the same.

129. See generally, e.g., Martineau, supra note 1; Petty, supra note 1; Steinman, supra note 2.
130. See generally, e.g., Brad D. Feldman, An Appeal for Immediate Appealability: Applying the
Collateral Order Doctrine to Orders Denying Appointed Counsel in Civil Rights Cases, 99 GEo. L.J.
1717, 1739-44 (addressing the appealability of orders denying appointed counsel in civil rights cases);
Robertson, supra note 3 (addressing the appealability of adverse privilege rulings); Stephen I. Vladeck,
Pendent Appellate Bootstrapping, 16 GREEN BAG 20 199, 204-10 (2013) (addressing pendant appellate
jurisdiction in the context of official immunity appeals).
131. Specifically, volumes 15A, 15B, and 16 address appeals before a final judgment.
132. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 103; Glynn, supra note 15; Petty, supra note 1; Steinman,
supra note 2.
133. Even when commentators discuss the courts of appeals, it is often only to mention the
ultimate decisions they reach; little attention is paid to the courts' approach or reasoning. See Anderson,
supra note 103, at 603-06; Glynn, supranote 15, at 215-16; Steinman, supra note 2, at 1273-75.
134. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING INTHE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 1-2 (2007) ("[The
courts of appeals] are much more important [than the Supreme Court] in setting and enforcing the law of
the United States" and "play by far the greatest legal policymaking role in the United States judicial
system."); id. at 2 ("Although an individual Supreme Court decision is more important than a
corresponding individual circuit court decision, the very limited docket of the Supreme Court leaves
U.S. law largely to the judgment of the circuits.").
135. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343
(2012); Roger J. Perlstadt, InterlocutoryReview of Litigation-Avoidance Claims: Insightsfrom Appeals
Under the FederalArbitration Act, 44 AKRON L. REV. 375 (2011); Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(b):
Seventy-Five and Ready for Retirement, 65 FLA. L. REV. 711 (2013) [hereinafter Pollis, Rule 54(b)];
Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the FederalCourts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1165, 1193-1201 (1990).
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C. A PreliminaryTaxonomy of InterlocutoryAppeals

Although the challenge of codifying the judge-made exceptions to the
final-judgment rule highlights the existing literature's shortcomings, it
also presents huge potential for future scholarly research. In this
section, I suggest a preliminary framework to guide that literature.
I do so with a taxonomy of interlocutory appeals. This taxonomy will
help identify the discrete issues with each exception that require
investigation. I suspect that the hierarchical relationship of a taxonomy
(as opposed to, say, a simple list of exceptions) also will help identify
the relationships between different exceptions and the purposes
underlying them. A taxonomy could help identify, for example, which
exceptions, or which kind of exceptions, work better when codified
rather than left to judicial definition and development. This structure
also could help identify the situations in which appeals as of right are
more appropriate than discretionary appeals, and vice versa.
This taxonomy, however, is necessarily preliminary. It should not be
treated as a concrete structure for investigating interlocutory appeals. It
will develop, expand, and perhaps even change wholesale as more
research is done. But it will still be a useful preliminary structure for
immediate research.
1. A Note About "Exceptions"
In discussions of interlocutory appeals, the vocabulary is not always
entirely clear or consistent. This ambiguity can lead to confusion when
discussing appellate jurisdiction. For example, I call the collateral order
doctrine an "exception" to the final-judgment rule. But there's some
debate over whether that characterization is correct. The Supreme Court
used to call the doctrine an exception to § 1291 but has more recently
denied as much, instead characterizing it as a "practical construction" of
that statute.136 There's similar debate over whether orders appealed
under a judge-made exception are actually "interlocutory" orders. The
judge-made exceptions are (at least in theory) an application of 28
U.S.C. § 1291's grant of appellate jurisdiction over "final decisions."

136. Compare Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) ("Section 1291
accordingly provides jurisdiction for this appeal only if orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases fall
within the 'collateral order' exception to the final judgment rule."), and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) ("Our decisions have recognized . . .a narrow exception to the
requirement that all appeals under § 1291 await final judgment on the merits."), with Digital Equip.
Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) ("The collateral order doctrine is best
understood not as an exception to the 'final decision' rule laid down by Congress in § 1291, but as a
'practical construction' of it.") (internal citation omitted), and Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)
(same).
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So the orders appealed under these exceptions should (again, at least in
theory) be "final" and not "interlocutory." Then there are the appeals
that arguably look like an interlocutory appeal in ongoing litigation but
are treated as appeals from final orders in a separate proceeding.
Contempt appeals are an example of this sort of appeal. The contempt
order relates to an ongoing piece of litigation, but the order is treated as
a final decision in a separate contempt proceeding.
It might simplify and streamline discussion of appellate jurisdiction to
settle on some agreed terms. I suggest looking at the matter practically.
Appeals from district court orders relate in some way to a piece of
litigation in that district court-they relate to a single judicial unit.
Some appeals are closely related to that litigation; an appeal from an
order dismissing an entire case for failure to state a claim is one
example. Other appeals have a more tangential relationship, such as an
appeal from a finding of contempt. The contempt order stems from
behavior in litigation but is rarely the main event. Even with these
orders, however, some relationship to a district court proceeding exists.
I suggest that any appeal before the traditional end of that districtcourt proceeding-when all issues are decided and all that remains is
enforcing the judgment-be treated
137 as an interlocutory appeal and an
exception the final-judgment rule.
This definition recognizes that appeals from district court orders stem
from some piece of district-court litigation. While that litigation is still
ongoing, the courts are allowing an appeal from something decided in a
district-court proceeding before those proceedings are over. Treating all
of these instances as interlocutory appeals and exceptions to the final
judgment simplifies some unnecessary complexity. It also highlights the
relationships between various types of appeals before a final
judgment-they're all variations on the same behavior; recognizing
them as such will help illustrate various similarities, differences,
purposes, practices, strengths, weaknesses, and more.
This definition doesn't remove all ambiguity. There still can be, for
example, uncertainty of what exactly is an appeal from a traditional final
judgment. But this definition can clear away some of the unnecessary
ambiguity in future discussions of interlocutory appeals.

137. In practice, this has not always captured all final judgments. Outstanding issues regarding
fees and costs will not prevent a judgment from being deemed final and appealable. See Ray Haluch
Gravel Co. Central Pension Fund, 134 S. Ct. 773, 780 (2014); Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486
U.S. 196, 202 (1988). Situations also exist in which courts will treat a district court's decision as final
even though some technical or ministerial action remains to be done in the district court. See 15B
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 12, § 3915.2, at 279-80. It might be useful to redefine a final
judgment to occur only after these lingering issues are resolved. I leave that question, however, for
another time.
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2. A Preliminary Taxonomy of Interlocutory Appeals
The exceptions to the final-judgment rule should first be divided into
those that are judge-made and those that are codified.138 This first
distinction is particularly appropriate given that the main purpose of this
research project is to assist in codification. Dividing the exceptions into
those that are judge-made and those that are already codified provides a
necessary first step in identifying potential candidates for codification.
It also assists in determining what connections exist between the judgemade and codified exceptions, the characteristics of a well-functioning
(and not-so-well-functioning) codified exception, and how to potentially
codify the judge-made exceptions.
Further sub-dividing the judge-made and codified exceptions could
take many forms. At this point, the most helpful distinction is probably
to categorize them as individual exceptions. Because the point of this
research project, at least initially, is to conduct deep research into each
of the exceptions, identifying the exceptions themselves is appropriate.
Moreover, any broader type of classification at this point-such as by
purpose, underlying theory, discretion versus as-of-right, etc.-likely
would be premature. The goal for now should be merely to uncover
those broader themes through research into how the courts of appeals
use the exceptions.
In the remainder of this Part, I list the potential sub-categories in the
interlocutory appeals taxonomy. I also briefly discuss several possible
avenues for research on specific exceptions. Neither this list nor the
ideas for future research are comprehensive; future work will
undoubtedly expand it. I end with a brief discussion of discretionary
appeals and what role they might play in codification.
a. Judge-Made Exceptions

There is probably no one way to slice up the various judge-made
exceptions to the final-judgment rule. The exceptions are not always
presented as distinct doctrines, and some of them overlap in their
approach, application, or results. But the existing literature often
recognizes at least four distinct judge-made exceptions to the final138. Several articles, in their background discussion of exceptions to the final-judgment rule,
implicitly or explicitly categorize the exceptions in various ways. See, e.g., Martineau, supra note 1, at
729-47 (separately discussing statutory, rule-based, and judicially created exceptions); Petty, supra note
1, at 355 (dividing the judge-made exceptions into three "functional groups": effective finality, practical
finality, and partial effective finality); Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 15, at 1648-59
(separately discussing exceptions that provide an appeal as-of-right and an appeal at the court's
discretion). After considering the various ways of cutting up interlocutory appeals, I have settled on one
that I think most appropriate for this project.
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judgment rule: Forgay appeals, the collateral order doctrine, Perlman
appeals, and pragmatic appeals.
But given my expansive definition of interlocutory appeals and
exceptions to the final-judgment rule, many more exceptions could be
added to this list. The caselaw has treated several types of orders
entered in ongoing litigation as final decisions. Contempt appeals are
one example. Appeals from denials of intervention are another. A
motion to intervene is made in ongoing litigation. And when courts
deny intervention, the would-be intervenor can immediately appeal that
decision. 139 Courts regularly treat these orders as final decisions, and
they certainly are final for the would-be intervenor. But the rest of the
case keeps going. Bringing these kinds of orders under the umbrella of
"interlocutory appeals" and "exceptions to the final-judgment rule"
expands the traditional notion of those terms. Treating them alongside
more traditional exceptions could inform our wider understanding of our
regime of appellate jurisdiction.
But for now, let's stick with the widely recognized exceptions.
i. The Collateral Order Doctrine
Most of the work on judge-made exceptions to the final-judgment
rule likely will focus on the collateral order doctrine, the most prevalent
judge-made exception to the final-judgment rule. This rule is rife with
potential avenues for investigation.
Cases applying the collateral order doctrine reveal, for example, the
potential difficulty of defining categories of appealable orders. The
Supreme Court has held that collateral order decisions must be made
categorically-a particular type of order is either always appealable or
always unappealable. 140 The courts of appeals often follow this
mandate. But they sometimes don't. Indeed, some cases are filled with
case-specific, non-categorical reasoning.141 This sporadic-but-persistent
defiance of the Supreme Court suggests that we can learn something
about the collateral order doctrine by looking to its application in the
139. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 331 U.S. 519,
524-25 (1947).
140. See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty., 527 U.S. 198, 206 (1999); Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994).
141. See generally Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 618 F.3d 398 (3d Cir. 2010);
United States v. Romeo-Ochoa, 554 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2009); McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.,
502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2007); Houston
Cty. Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., Inc., 481 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2007); Pierce v. Blaine,
467 F.3d 362 (3d Cir. 2006); Goodman v. Harris Cty., 443 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2006); ADAPT of Phila.
v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 2005); Baldridge v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 404 F.3d 930
(5th Cir. 2005); Competitive Tech., Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 374 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2004); United States v.
Hickey, 367 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2004).
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courts of appeals. Judges might, for example, intentionally ignore the
categorical requirement when they want to hear (or not hear) a particular
case. Or this defiance might be inadvertent. I suspect a third
explanation: that non-categorical decisions stem from the practical
difficulties of deciding collateral order cases. Courts are asked in these
cases to make a pragmatic assessment of whether an entire category of
orders should be appealable while having only the limited data of the
single case in front of them. Only close study of the courts of appeals'
behavior will shed any light on this.
Decisions in the collateral order context might also shed light on the
One criticism of
value of flexibility in appellate jurisdiction.
codification is that it would not be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new,
unforeseen circumstances. 142 And one of the collateral order doctrine's
benefits is its flexibility. 143 The Rules Committee will need to
determine whether to retain a similar flexibility in the rules and, if so,
how to retain it. Study of how the courts have used the collateral order
doctrine to address unforeseen issues could inform this work.
Finally, given the immensity and variety of the caselaw on the
collateral order doctrine, future research might also benefit from further
dividing this exception into sub-categories based on the type of
appealable order. Immunity appeals in particular might merit their own
focused study. Many cases developing and applying the collateral order
doctrine involve some type of Constitutional, statutory, or common law
immunity from the burdens of litigation. And the denial of many
immunities-such as qualified immunity for government actors and
144
immunity from double jeopardy-can be immediately appealed.
142. See Cooper, supra note 99, at 157; Martineau, supra note 1, at 775; Nagel, supranote 123, at
216. Rule advocates disagree. See Glynn, supra note 15, at 261 (contending that a categorical approach
to interlocutory appeals "offers potential flexibility"); Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 179 (suggesting that
"experience with [the] stubborn problem [of determining appealability] can be converted into ruleprescribed standards"). Again, which side has the better argument is unclear; both arguments are
reasonable, and we lack the data necessary to determine who's right. See Lammon, supra note 1, at
434-36.
143. This can be seen in the recent cases addressing appeals denying the protection of anti-SLAPP
laws. These laws generally protect defendants from lawsuits brought with the purpose or effect of
chilling constitutionally protected speech; early in the litigation, the defendant can force the plaintiff to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits before the case can proceed. Some states provide-in
their own courts-for an immediate appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion. When antiSLAPP motions made their way into federal court (in cases brought under the diversity jurisdiction), the
courts of appeals had to then determine whether denials of those motions could be immediately
appealed. No one appears to have seen this issue coming, so strict categorical rules would not likely
have addressed the issue. But using the flexible approach of the collateral order doctrine, the courts of
appeals have reasonably addressed these issues. See, e.g., NCDR, L.L.C. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C.,
745 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2014); Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2012); Henry
v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009); Englert v. MacDonnell, 551 F.3d 1099
(9th Cir. 2009); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
144. See, e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144-45
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Immunity appeals have created substantial trouble in the appellate
jurisdiction caselaw and scholarship. 145 In-depth analysis of how the
courts-both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals-deal with
immunity appeals might reveal the outlines for separately codifying the
rules on those appeals.

ii. Perlman & Contempt Appeals
There's more to say about Perlman. In its nearly 100-year history,
Perlman cases have produced a number of unresolved questions in the
courts of appeals. For instance, are Perlman appeals available only in
the grand jury context or can privilege claimants bring them in civil and
criminal cases, too? 146 How should courts determine whether the third-

party target of the discovery order is actually disinterested? 147 Does
148
disclosure of the privileged information moot a Perlman appeal?

How does in camera review by a district court affect the availability of a
(1993) (permitting appeals from the denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 527-30 (1985) (permitting appeals from the denial of qualified immunity for government
officials); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-08 (1979) (permitting appeals from the denial of
Speech & Debate Clause immunity); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (permitting
appeals from the denial immunity from double jeopardy).
145. See generally Anderson, supra note 103.
146. Most courts of appeals have allowed Perlman appeals in civil and criminal cases. The Tenth
Circuit limits them to only the grand-jury context. See supra note 44.
147. This question has produced the deepest split in Perlman appeals. Most courts of appeals take
an objective, categorical approach to this question--either a type of third party (e.g., an attorney) is
always deemed disinterested, or it's not. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d 695, 697-99
(1st Cir. 1997); In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings--Gordon,
722 F.2d 303, 306-07 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1, 676 F.2d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir.
1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Malone), 655 F.2d 882, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d 199, 201-03 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). Other courts adopt a case-by-case
approach and ask, as a factual matter, whether the third party is actually disinterested. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1172, 1180 (10th Cir. 2010); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The majority approach is probably the better one; although it won't screen out all
interested third parties, it does not have the problems of appellate fact-finding and odd incentives that
the case-by-case approach does.
148. Several courts have held that disclosure does in fact moot a Perlman appeal. See Wilson v.
O'Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Nat'l Mortg. Equity Corp. Mortg. Pool Certificates
Litig., 821 F.2d 1422, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Lavender, 583 F.2d 630, 633 (2d
Cir. 1978) (holding that the need for a Perlman appeal vanishes after the allegedly privileged material is
disclosed). Others disagree, concluding that the controversy is not moot because the documents can be
returned to the privilege claimant. See Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States, 156 F.3d 1038, 1040
(10th Cir. 1998); Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Dec. 7 & 8 v. United States, 40 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th
Cir. 1994); see also Win. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1982)
(allowing a Perlman appeal after disclosure with no discussion of mootness). The courts that have
deemed these cases moot seem to me to have the better argument. Although the controversy over the
privileged information is not itself moot, the Perlman appeal is moot: Perlman appeals exist to prevent
wrongful disclosure, and once that disclosure has occurred (and secrecy been lost) there is no longer a
need for an immediate appeal.
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Perlman appeal? 149 In the course of codifying Perlman, the Committee
could resolve these issues. But how to resolve them can only be
answered after further research into Perlman.
If the closely related context of contempt appeals is to be codified, the
Committee might consider modifying the current system to allow parties
to appeal from findings of civil contempt. Commentators and judges
have suggested doing so for some time, and codification might be the
best answer. More research into contempt appeals is necessary before
determining whether expanding contempt appeals in this manner is wise.
The combination of Perlman appeals and contempt appeals could
address an appellate jurisdiction issue on which the Committee has spent
the most of its time: the appealability of discovery orders adverse to a
claim of attorney-client privilege. The Committee has run into several
problems with setting out such a rule, among them the lack of contempt
appeals when a party is found in civil contempt. 15 One solution could
be to change the rule for contempt appeals so that privilege claimants
held in any type of contempt could disobey, be found in contempt, and
Perlman appeals could
appeal the underlying discovery order.
supplement this route for those instances when the privilege claimant
does not control discovery. Still, such a regime wouldn't be perfect;
those risking contempt would face the unattractive possibility of stiff
fines or jail time. But it could go a long way toward improving the
current system.
iii. Pragmatic Appeals
Finally are pragmatic appeals, which stem from the Supreme Court's
decision in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.15 1 In cases involving
pragmatic appeals, the court balances the costs and benefits of an
immediate appeal on a case-by-case basis. 152 The Supreme Court
appears to have limited the pragmatic finality approach of Gillespie to
its unique facts-the district court's order, which had struck some but
not all of a plaintiffs claims, had "disposed of an unsettled issue of

149. This issue arises when a privilege claimant gives materials to a district court judge for in
camera review. If the judge then orders discovery of the material, a few courts have held that the
privilege claimant can then take a Perlman appeal; the district court judge is a disinterested third partythe judge cannot be expected to stand in contempt just so the privilege claimant can appeal-and the
privilege claimant no longer possesses the material and thus has no contempt option. See United States
v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 194 (3d Cir. 1981). The better practice in this scenario is probably for the
judge to return the material to the claimant, whereupon the claimant can then take the contempt route.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 190 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 1999).
150. See Struve, supra note 5.
151. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
152. See generally 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, at § 3913; Redish, supra note 18.
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national significance . . . and the arguable finality issue had not been
presented to [the] Court until argument on the merits" 5 3 and deemed
the doctrine dead.154 Commentators agree with this assessment. 155 The
doctrine nevertheless pops up from time to time in the courts
56 of appeals,
suggesting that the concept may not yet be entirely dead. 1
b. Codified Exceptions
Codified exceptions come in two forms: statutory and rule-based.
Further study of these exceptions could be of great use. The codified
exceptions fit together with the judge-made ones to make up the system
of interlocutory appeals. Understanding the scope of the already
codified exceptions is necessary to determining the proper scope of any
codification of judge-made exceptions. Study of the codified exceptions
also could reveal purposes and policies that cut across the divide
between codified and judge-made exceptions, shedding further light on
both types of exceptions. Finally, a codification project might also
reform some of the codified exceptions.
i. Statutory Exceptions
A number of statutory exceptions to the final-judgment rule provide
potential ground for research. These include:
*
*
*
*
*

Interlocutory orders involving injunctions under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1);
Certified appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b);
Writs of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651;
Orders granting or denying a motion to remand a removed
class action under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1); and
Orders involving arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 16.

153. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,477 n.30 (1978).
154. See id. ("If Gillespie were extended beyond the unique facts of that case, § 1291 would be
stripped of all significance.").
155. See Petty, supra note 1, at 372 ("Coopers & Lybrand definitively shut the door on practical
finality in the context of judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule .... ").
156. For an example of a litigant recently invoking the pragmatic-appeals exception, see Western
Energy Alliance v. Salazar, 709 F.3d 1040, 1049-51 (10th Cir. 2013). For other signs that pragmatic
appeals are not yet entirely foreclosed, see Comm'r v. JT USA, LP, 630 F.3d 1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir.
2011) (describing the requirements for a pragmatic appeal in the Ninth Circuit); Interfaith Cmty Org. v.
Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 2005) (allowing a pragmatic appeal); Bender v. Clark,
744 F.2d 1424, 1427-28 (10th Cir. 1984) (same). But see Kmart Corp. v. Aronds, 123 F.3d 297, 300
(5th Cir. 1997) ("[T]his Court no longer recognizes the [pragmatic finality] exception.").
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Of these exceptions, certified appeals under
15 7 § 1292(b) and writs of
mandamus probably merit the most attention.
Under § 1292(b), a district court judge can certify for an immediate
appeal an interlocutory order that "involves a controlling question of law
as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" when
"an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation."' 15 8 The decision to certify an
order is discretionary and essentially unreviewable. 159 If the district
court certifies the matter for appeal, the 60
Court of Appeals has unfettered
discretion to decline to hear the appeal.' 1
Michael E. Solimine has done some valuable work on the use of §
1292(b), surveying for several calendar years all published circuit and
district court opinions using § 1292(b) and the motions to certify a §
1292(b) appeal in the Sixth Circuit. 16 Tory Weigand has surveyed all
of the available First Circuit decisions on § 1292(b),162 while Alexandra
B. Hess, Stephanie L. Parker, and Tala K. Toufanian have examined
fifteen years of § 1292(b) cases in the Federal Circuit. 163 But more can
be done. Solimine's study could be updated (it's over twenty-five years
old). And with the advent of PACER, research now could investigate
district court orders denying motions to certify an appeal under §
1292(b).
As for writs of mandamus, the courts of appeals can use the writ in
extraordinary situations to reverse a district court order. 164 The exact
requirements for issuing the writ are unclear. 165 It could be illuminating
to see how exactly the courts of appeals have used the writ over the past
several decades, examining what standards they use in deciding petitions
and in what situations they issue the writ. Paul R. Gugliuzza has done
157. Section 1292(a)(1) might also provide some interesting research. That section provides for
an immediate appeal, as-of-right, from interlocutory district court orders "granting, continuing,
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). It could be informative to see the marginal cases in which a court of appeals must
determine whether a district court order falls under that subsection's language.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
159. But see Mackenzie M. Horton, Mandamus, Stop in the Name of Discretion: The Judicial
"Myth " of the District Court's Absolute and Unreviewable Discretion in Section 1292(b) Certification,
64 BAYLOR L. REv. 976 (2012).
160. See 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) ("The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal
of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order .
.
161. See generally Solimine, supra note 135, especially at 1193-1205.
162. See generally Tory Weigand, Discretionary Interlocutory Appeals Under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b): A First Circuit Survey and Review, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 183 (2014).
163. See generally Alexandra B. Hess, Stephanie L. Parker & Tala K. Toufanian, Permissive
Interlocutory Appeals at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Fifteen Years in Review (19952010), 60 Am. U. L. REv. 757 (2011).
164. See, e.g., Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-82 (2004).
165. See Steinman, supra note 2, at 1269-70.
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on the Federal Circuit. 166 Other circuits should
such a study
receive
similarfocused
treatment.
ii. Rule-Based Exceptions

Only two exceptions to the final-judgment rule are found in the
Federal Rules: appeals from orders involving class certification under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) and appeals of partial final
judgments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Research into
these could be particularly enlightening when thinking about codifying
other exceptions. Andrew Pollis already has done some excellent work
with Rule 54(b). 167 Rule 23(f) might benefit from similar treatment.
D. Remembering Discretion

In all of this, the arguments for discretionary appeals cannot be
ignored. Although a wholesale switch seems unlikely, it might be more
plausible to experiment with discretionary appeals. I have argued
elsewhere that much of the debate over rules or discretion is abstract and
not grounded in experience. 168 Arguments are based on perfectly
reasonable assumptions about how people would react to different
rules. 169 But those arguments are inconsistent with70 one another, and
there's no theoretical way to resolve the differences. 1
Experimentation can provide some experience that will help resolve
these debates or at least move them forward a bit. I have argued for
judicial experimentation-an informal common-law process whereby
judges continually evaluate the consequences of their appealability
decisions. 171 But such experimentation also could come from rules.
The Committee might, for example, create a system of discretionary
appeals in one or two circuits for a limited time. The experience in
those circuits would shed some light on the wisdom of discretionary
appeals in the federal system. Such experimentation would no doubt
face problems-practical, political, and Constitutional-but it might be
worth exploring.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 135.
See generally Pollis, Rule 54(b), supra note 135.
See generally Latnnon, supra note 1, at 433-3 6.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 444-45.
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V. CONCLUSION

The courts of appeals' recent restrictions on Perlman appeals are
mistaken. Perlman appeals, like contempt appeals, exist to allow
appellate review before privileged information is disclosed, thereby
losing that information's secrecy forever. The courts' limiting Perlman
appeals to non-parties-based primarily on a line in a Supreme Court
opinion taken largely out of context--overlooks Perlman's purpose.
And this oversight likely is due to the incomplete body of knowledge on
Perlman.

This particular issue of appellate jurisdiction is but one of many that
are ripe for research. And that research is more valuable than ever.
We're closer now to possibly reforming the current regime of
interlocutory appeals in federal court than we have been in some time.
This reform (should it happen) likely will take the form of transforming
the judge-made exceptions into largely categorical rules. If these
codified exceptions are to strike a reasonable balance between delaying
and allowing appeals, much work needs to be done.
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